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It is suggested to consider long term trends of financial markets as a growth phenomenon.
The question that is asked is what conditions are needed for a long term sustainable growth
or contraction in a financial market? The paper discuss the role of traditional market players
of long only mutual funds versus hedge funds which take both short and long positions. It
will be argued that financial markets since their very origin and only till very recently, have
been in a state of “broken symmetry” which favored long term growth instead of contraction.
The reason for this “broken symmetry” into a long term “bull phase” is the historical almost
complete dominance by long only players in financial markets. Dangers connected to short
trading are illustrated by the appearence of long term bearish trends seen in analytical results
and by simulation results of an agent based market model. Recent short trade data of the
Nasdaq Composite index show an increase in the short activity prior to or at the same time
as dips in the market, and reveal an steadily increase in the short trading activity, reaching
levels never seen before.
Stock markets are known to be notoriously difficult to predict. The impossibility of predicting has been
formalized in the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) which states that all available information is included
in prices[1, 2]. Still without attempting specific prediction, it makes very well sense to ask which conditions
are needed for a substainable trend, e.g. what is the “fuel” needed for a manifestation of a longer term bull
or bear market? In this paper it is suggested to consider long term trends of financial markets as a growth
phenomenon. The paper will discuss the role of traditional market players of long only mutual funds versus
the recent arrival of hedge funds which take both short and long positions. Short selling[3, 4, 5] happens
when speculators sell, say at time t0 to price P (t0), securities that they do not own but borrow. At a later
time, say t1, the speculator has to buy the security and give it back to it’s owner. In case of a price decline
between t0 and t1 the speculator thereby makes the profit P (t0) − P (t1). This is in contrast to long only
funds who are only allowed to own securities and therefore can only profit when prices rise. To make an
analogy with a physical system, it will be argued that financial markets since their very origin and only
till very recently, have been in a state of “broken symmetry” which favored long term growth instead of
contraction. The reason for this “broken symmetry” into a long term “bull phase” is the historical almost
complete dominance by long only players in financial markets. Only with the recent arrival of investors that
take up short positions is the symmetry slowly being restored, with the implications, as will be argued in
this paper, of an increased probability for lasting decline of the markets, i.e. appearance of a long term
“bear phase”.
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Let us for a moment imagine a financial market could be completely determined by the action of just
one powerful investor. This is in contrast to traditional economic theory which view the stock market
as reflecting the state of economy, i.e. the prices of stocks should reflect present earnings as well as the
expectation value of all future earnings of a given company. An alternative view would be to consider
the stock market as the “motor” of the economy illustrated e.g. by the so called “wealth effect”, where
increasing stock market prices leads to higher consumer confidence and spending, which in turns leads to
larger earnings of companies making stocks rise, etc. ad infinitum. With this in mind, one could ask how
big a fortune would such an investor need and which expectations about future developments in interest
rate and dividends would ensure the investor to maintain a given growth of the market to his own profit? In
order to answer these questions, consider first the case of a large mutual long-only fund that tries to control
the market. The wealth of the fund, W , at any given time t is:
W (t) = n(t)P (t) + C(t) , (1)
where P (t) is the price of the market, n(t) is the number of market shares held and C(t) the cash possessed
by the fund at time t[6]. At each time step the dominating fund buys new market shares in order to push up
the price of the market, creating an excess demand of market shares, A(t). A(t), give rise to the following
equation for the return r(t) of the market [7, 8]:
r(t) ≡ ln(P (t+ 1)) − ln(P (t)) = A(t)/λ, (2)
where P (t) is the price of the market and λ is the liquidity of the market. The fact that the price goes in
the direction of the sign of the order imbalance A(t) is well-documented [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. A(t) will first
be taken a constant, A(t) ≡ A i.e. we have
r(t) ≈
d lnP (t)
dt
= A/λ; P (t) = eAt/λ, (3)
and
dn(t)
dt
= A; n(t) = At, (4)
Besides expenses to keep on buying shares, the mutual fund get an income from dividends, d(t), of the shares
it’s already holding, and from interest rates, r(t), of its cash supply C(t). As will be seen the expectation
of future dividends d(t) and future interest rates r(t) is crucial in designing a profitable strategy for the
mutual fund. Since the aim of this paper is to study long term trends where changes in dividends can be
much more important compared to changes in interest rates, r(t) will be taken constant, r(t) ≡ r, and the
focus will be the time dependence of d(t). Consider first the simplest case where also d is constant: d(t) ≡ d.
The balance equation for the cash supply as a function of time therefore reads[15]:
dC(t)
dt
= −
dn
dt
P (t) + C(t)r + n(t)d+ Cflow(t, r(t), d(t), P (t), ...) (5)
= −AeAt/λ + C(t)r +Atd+ Cflow(t, r(t), d(t), P (t), ...) (6)
The term Cflow(t, r(t), d(t), P (t), ...) describes the possibility of additional inflow/outflow of money into the
fund and as indicated can be thought of to depend on time, dividends, interest rates, the price of the market
as well as many other factors like e.g. tax cuts etc[16]. In practice the inflow/outflow of liquidity often
contributes a significant part to the total wealth of a mutual fund, but for clarity Cflow(t, r(t), d(t), P (t)...)
will be taken equal to 0 first, before discussing the relevance of various functional forms below. It is preferable
to express (6) in terms of the growth rate of the financial market, α ≡ A/λ and the cash in terms of the
market liquidity, C¯ ≡ C/λ in which case (6) become:
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dC¯(t)
dt
= −αeαt + C¯(t)r + αtd (7)
The solution of (7) reads:
C¯(t) =
αeαt
r − α
−
αdt
r
−
αd
r2
+
ert
r − α
{−α−
α2d
r2
+
αd
r
+ C0(r − α)} (8)
The condition to determine whether the mutual fund can impose a given growth of the stock market is
that C(t) > P (t) ∀t , i.e. the cash supply should always be large enough that yet another market share
can be bought. The time dependence of (8) is dominated by the factors eαt and ert expressing the growth
due to the stock market and interest rates respectively. For a stock market with a growth rate larger than
the interest rate, α > r the first term on the r.h.s. of (8) dominates and becomes negative. In this case
the growth of the stock market is not sustainable, and depending on the values of r, d, C0 the investor will
inevitably face a critical time, tc, without enough money to secure further growth of the stock market. This
situation is illustrated by the liquidity curve b) in Fig. 1 for the case α = 0.2, r = 0.1 and d = 0.02 [18]: after
approximately 750 days the liquidity of the investor falls below the price of the stock market given by curve
a) and he can no longer secure the 20% growth of the stock market. Had the investor received four times
more in dividend, illustrated by curve c), tc would only be delayed by some few tens of days. Increasing the
initial amount of liquidity, curve d), push tc further to the future, but eventually, for a “super” interest rate
growth of the stock market, the investor will fall short of money and the growth have to stop. On the other
hand for “sub” interest rate growth α < r the term ert dominates and a sustainable growth depends on the
values of (α, r, d). A α = 7% growth, curve e), with interest rates at r = 10% and dividends d = 2% can be
sustained if the initial amount of money is large enough curve f) whereas lowering the initial liquidity the
growth no longer becomes sustainable, curve g).
The Eq. (8) illustrates the case that the expectation of a constant dividend d is not sufficient for a super
interest rate market growth as e.g. was seen in the booming stock market growth of the ninetees. Clearly in
that case the rise of the stock market was closely related to the sky rocketing expectations (justified or not)
of future dividends. Using the Efficient Market Hypothesis an investor would expect the dividend to follow
the growth of the stock market, and as will be seen super interest rate growth become possible in that case.
If one take the dividend to increase proportional to the price d(t) ≡ d0P (t) (7) takes the form:
dC¯(t)
dt
= −αeαt + C¯(t)r + αteαtd0 (9)
with the solution:
C¯(t) = αeαt{
td0 − 1
α− r
−
d0
(α− r)2
}+ ert{
−rα+ α2 + αd0
(α− r)2
+ C0} (10)
Curve b) in Fig. 2 illustrates a solution of (10) where a given amount of initial liquidity and a interest rate
r of 10%, a dividend d0 of 2% is not enough to sustain a stock market growth of 20% (curve a)). On the
other hand, for a higher initial dividend d0 of 8% and same initial amount of liquidity, super interest growth
of 20% does become sustainable (i.e. C(t) ≥ P (t) ∀t) as illustrated by curve c). Sufficient initial funds are
however required as illustrated by curve d) where a high initial dividend of 8% is not sufficient to avoid that
the investor runs out of money (C(t) < P (t) for t ≈ 2800). For each set of values (d0, C0) there exists a
range of growth potentials, α, for the investor r < αlow < α < αhigh. If the investor chooses to push up the
market at a too slow growth rate α < αlow he eventually will run out of money at large time scales, whereas
for a too fast growth α > αhigh the investor will miss money to continue buying shares at short time scales.
For the case illustrated by curve c) in Fig. 2, αlow = 0.18, αhigh = 0.32.
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The discussion so far has been on a large mutual long-only fund that tries to benefit from a constant
growth in a stock market. Eqs.(6) and (9) also describe the more morbid situation where a hedge fund
tries to benefit from a constant decline in a stock market by short selling. This situation is described in (9)
taking α and d0 negative. d0 should be taken negative since a short seller has to pay dividend to the owner
from which the stock was borrowed. Instead of the condition C(t) > P (t) that was needed at all times for
a mutual fund to keep on buying shares, a hedge fund would need to ensure that W (t) > |n|P (t), i.e. the
wealth of the hedge fund has to be sufficient that it can at any time buy back all the shares n that it has
borrowed (and sold) at an earlier time[19]. Figure 3 illustrates the case c) of Figure 2 with an interest rate of
r = 10% and dividend d0 = 8% and the same initial liquidity C0 = 10 but now α = −20% (curve a). Since
the wealth W (t), curve c), is above |n|P (t), curve b), it is indeed sustainable (and very profitable (!) as
seen from the wealth curve) for a dominating hedge fund to force a continuous decline of the stock market.
Notice that the case of a dominating long-only mutual fund that pushes the prices up versus the case of a
dominating short-only hedge fund that makes the market tumble is only symmetric on short time scales.
This is illustrated in curve d) in Fig. 3 which shows the wealth of a long-only fund with same parameters as
the short-only fund curve c), except for the signs of α and d. Since the difference is however small on time
scales relevant for trading (e.g. the difference in wealth is less than 2% after 5 years for the example given
in Fig. 3) the difference will be ignored in the following.
One can think of many different and relevant expressions of the flow term Cflow(t, r(t), d(t), P (t), ...). The
simplest case where customers add/subtract a constant flow of money per time unit, Cflow(t, r(t), d(t), P (t), ...) =
µ, would not change anything of the analysis presented of (6) and (9) since eαt and ert would still be the dom-
inant factors. Taking into account the interest rate in the inflow/outflow, Cflow(t, r(t), d(t), P (t), ...) = µe
rt,
would create a dominant µtert term in the case of a constant dividend (6). However in the more relevant case
where the dividend follows the price, d = d0P (t) (9) super interest market growth would still be dominated
by the td0α−rαe
αt term and the conclusions presented above would remain unchanged.
The eqs. (6) and (9) express the case of one single powerful investor that has enough liquidity to drive
the market. This is clearly not a very realistic situation, but as will be seen it helps understanding the
much more realistic and complex case of a group of investors that all try to drive the market for their own
profit. One very much studied market model with competing agents is the so called “Minority Game” (MG)
introduced by Challet and Zhang [20]. In the “Minority Game” the first approximation is to include only
the direction of a market move by representing a financial time series as a binary time series B(t) with 0
corresponding to a down move and 1 to an up move. Having in total N agents, each agent i possesses a
memory of the last m digits of B(t). A strategy gives a prediction for the next outcome of B(t) based on
the history of the last m digits of B. Since there are 2m possible histories, the total number of strategies
is given by S = 22
m
. Each agent holds the same number s (in general different) of strategies among the
S possible strategies. At each time t, every agent uses her most successful strategy (in terms of payoff,
see below) to decide whether to buy or sell an asset. The agent takes an action ai(t) = ±1 where 1 is
interpreted as buying an asset and −1 as selling an asset. The excess demand, A(t), at time t is therefore
given as A(t) =
∑N
i=1 ai(t). The return and the price of the market is as before given by (2) In the MG
the payoff function of a strategy, gMGi (t), was rewarding strategies that a each time step belong to the
minority decision: gMGi (t) = −ai(t)A(t). However as stressed in another paper, ([21]), in real markets, the
driving force underlying the competition between investors is not a struggle to be in the minority at each
time step, but rather a fierce competition to gain money. Introducing profit as the selection mechanism
for the strategies the payoff function was shown to take the form[21]: g$i (t + 1) = ai(t)A(t + 1) The same
payoff function was also used in another market model by Giardina and Bouchaud[22, 17]. Consequently the
market model with this payoff function was called the $-game as a reminder that profit drives the selection
of strategies.
Figure 4 illustrates one price history (fat solid line) of the $-game with N = 20 agents, r = 10%, d0 = 8%
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assuming like before that the dividend follows the market price d(t) = d0P (t). The parameter values used
were s = 4,m = 8, C0 = 50. Stochasticity was introduced via the initial strategies hold by the agents as
well as by N additional “noise” agents who at each time step made a random decision to either sell or
buy one market share. The liquidity parameter, λ, in (2) was determined using the assumption that an
univocal decision of all the agents to sell an asset should lead to a “crash” of 10%, i.e. from the condition
r(t) = −2N/λ = −10%. The 10% was chosen to mimic some of the very largest crashes seen in financial
markets. Thin dotted lines represent the 5%, 50% and 95% quantiles (from bottom to top) respectively, i.e.
at every time t out of the 1000 different initial configurations only 50 got below the 5% quantile line, 500
got below the 50% quantile and 950 below the 95 % quantile. The average behavior of an agent1 can now
be understood using the analysis of eq.’s (1)-(10)
All the N agents in figure 4 were long-only, i.e. they correspond to the case represented in figure 2 curve
c). As predicted from the analysis of (9) the price P (t) is in average tilted towards positive returns. Figure 5
represents simulations with the same parameter values as in figure 4 except that a fraction, ρ = 0.20 of the
agents can be both short and long. As can be seen from the 5% quantile, the introduction of agents that
can take short positions clearly increases the probability significantly for a lasting bearish trend. Increasing
ρ to 0.4 amplifies this tendency, again in accordance with (9) as illustrated by the short-only hedge fund
figure 3 curve c.
Figure 7 shows the Nasdaq Composite index (fat solid line) as well as statistics of short selling over the
time period 1/1 2000 - 1/8 2003. Dotted line represents the fraction of change in shares shorted, ns(t), defined
as the monthly total number of change in shares shorted divided by the total monthly share volume[23].
The dashed line represents the cumulative fraction of change in shares shorted, Qs(t) =
∑t
t′=0 ns(t
′). Both
ns(t) and Qs(t) have been multiplied with a factor 10
5 in order to make possible a comparison with the
temporal evolution of the Nasdaq index. An interesting quantity in the present context would be the short
activity, As(t), simply defined as the total volume of short transactions divided by the total volume of
transactions. Notice that ns(t) gives the lower bound on As(t) since short positions opened and closed (or
vice versa) within a month are not counted in ns(t) whereas they would be in As(t). Since ns(t) typically
varies between 0.1-0.6 % it is not unreasonable to assume As(t) to be one order of magnitude larger, i.e.
some few %. This means that the short activity on the Nasdaq index could be in the neighborhood that
lead to a high probability of a lasting bearish trend seen in e.g. Fig. 4-6.
Simple visual inspection of the short trade data in Fig. 7 reveals an increase in the short activity ns(t)
prior to or at the same time as dips in the market (see e.g. spring and fall 2000, summer 2001, fall 2002).
Looking at the overall activity clearly confirms this pattern with a steadily increase in the cumulative short
trading activity Qs(t) over the time period 2000 till summer 2001 and a steadily decrease of the market in
the same time period. It is puzzling however, that one see an continuous increase of short activity so far
in 2003 where the market also has made an increase. Either the market is right and short sellers will have
to cover their positions in further progress of the market (i.e. Qs(t) should decrease in the future), or the
short sellers got it right and the market is in for a future dip[24].
It is clearly not easy to estimate precisely what impact short trading has on the evolution of financial
markets. Still this paper has tried to point out some of the dangers connected to short trading as illustrated
by the appearing of long term bearish trends seen in the analysis of (9) and by the simulation results in
Fig. 4-6. It should be noted from Fig. 4-6 that even as the fraction of agents that use short trading increase,
the probability for a long term “bullish” phase remain unchanged as illustrated by the 95% quantile lines
which are unchanged in all three cases. This highlights that the danger with short selling is not when the
markets are already in a long term bullish phase, since short sellers then are forced to cover their positions.
1when using the word “agent” hereafter is meant to refer to the N agents that use strategies in the decision to buy or sell
5
The real danger is instead when a downwards spiral of the markets has begun, in which case an increase
in short trading activity will only increase the downward trend. Looking at the bad performance of the
markets over the past years together with the increase in short selling activity, which was virtually absent
just few years ago, the present study suggest the possibility that financial markets could have entered a new
era not seen so far.
The author thanks D. Sornette for useful discussions.
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Figure 1: a) Price P (t) of (3) as a function of time t for α = 0.2. b) Cash C(t) solution of (6) for the case
α = 0.2, r = 0.1, C0 = 2 and d = 0.02. c) Similar to curve b) but with d = 0.08. d) similar to c) but with
C0 = 5. e) Price P (t) of (3) for α = 0.07. f) Cash C(t) solution of (6) for the case α = 0.07, r = 0.1, C0 = 5
and d = 0.02. c) Similar f) but with C0 = 2.
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Figure 2: a) Price P (t) of (3) as a function of time t for α = 0.2. b) Cash C(t) solution of (9) for the case
α = 0.2, r = 0.1, C0 = 10 and d = 0.02. c) Similar to curve b) but with d = 0.08. d) similar to c) but with
C0 = 5.
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Figure 3: a) Price P (t) of (3) as a function of time t for α = −0.2. b) |n|P (t) for the case α = −0.2, r =
0.1, C0 = 10 and d = −0.08. c) Wealth, W (t) as a solution of (9) and (1) for the parameters of curve b).
Same as curve b) except for signs of α, d, α = 0.2 and d = 0.08.
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Figure 4: Fat solid line: price P (t) from one configuration of the $-game with N = 20 agents, r = 10%,
d0 = 8% (assuming dividend d(t) = d0P (t)). The parameter values used were s = 4,m = 8, C0 = 50.
Stochasticity was introduced via N additional “noise” agents. The fraction of agents allowed to take short
positions, ρ = 0. Liquidity parameter λ = 0.0025. Thin dotted lines represent the 5%, 50% and 95% quantiles
(from bottom to top) respectively, i.e. at every time t out of the 1000 different initial configurations only
50 got below the 5% quantile line and similarly for the other quantile lines.
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Figure 5: Same as figur 4 but with ρ = 0.2
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Figure 6: Same as figur 4 but with ρ = 0.4
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Figure 7: Fat solid line represents the Nasdaq Composite index. Dotted line represents the fraction of
change in shares shorted, ns(t), defined as the monthly total number of change in shares shorted divided
by the total monthly share volume. The dashed line represents the cumulative fraction of change in shares
shorted, Qs(t) =
∑t
0 ns(t). Both ns(t) and Qs(t) have been multiplied with a factor 10
5.
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